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편집 파일: randomize_kstack.h

/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ #ifndef _LINUX_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_H #define _LINUX_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_H #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/jump_label.h> #include <linux/percpu-defs.h> DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_MAYBE(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT, randomize_kstack_offset); DECLARE_PER_CPU(u32, kstack_offset); /* * Do not use this anywhere else in the kernel. This is used here because * it provides an arch-agnostic way to grow the stack with correct * alignment. Also, since this use is being explicitly masked to a max of * 10 bits, stack-clash style attacks are unlikely. For more details see * "VLAs" in Documentation/process/deprecated.rst */ void *__builtin_alloca(size_t size); /* * Use, at most, 10 bits of entropy. We explicitly cap this to keep the * "VLA" from being unbounded (see above). 10 bits leaves enough room for * per-arch offset masks to reduce entropy (by removing higher bits, since * high entropy may overly constrain usable stack space), and for * compiler/arch-specific stack alignment to remove the lower bits. */ #define KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(x) ((x) & 0x3FF) /* * These macros must be used during syscall entry when interrupts and * preempt are disabled, and after user registers have been stored to * the stack. */ #define add_random_kstack_offset() do { \ if (static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT, \ &randomize_kstack_offset)) { \ u32 offset = raw_cpu_read(kstack_offset); \ u8 *ptr = __builtin_alloca(KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(offset)); \ /* Keep allocation even after "ptr" loses scope. */ \ asm volatile("" :: "r"(ptr) : "memory"); \ } \ } while (0) #define choose_random_kstack_offset(rand) do { \ if (static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT, \ &randomize_kstack_offset)) { \ u32 offset = raw_cpu_read(kstack_offset); \ offset ^= (rand); \ raw_cpu_write(kstack_offset, offset); \ } \ } while (0) #endif